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The	  finance-­‐mining	  nexus	  in	  South	  Africa:	  How	  mining	  companies	  use	  the	  South	  African	  equity	  
market	  to	  speculate	  	  	   Abstract	  Until	   recently,	   the	   deepening	   of	   financial	   markets	   in	   developing	   countries	   has	   been	   almost	  unequivocally	  seen	  as	  growth-­‐enhancing.	  1	  A	  well-­‐developed	  capital	  market	  –	  so	  the	  argument	  –	  could	  provide	  a	  source	  of	  finance	  for	  productive	  investment,	  fostering	  growth.	  South	  Africa	  possesses	  one	  of	  the	  oldest	  stock	  exchanges	  among	  emerging	  economies,	  the	  Johannesburg	  Stock	  Exchange	  (JSE).	  Hence,	  it	  provides	  a	  good	  case	  study	  to	  scrutinise	  this	  growth-­‐enhancing	  effect.	  	  The	  South	  African	  equity	  market	  is	  a	  source	  of	  substantial	  funds	  for	  mining	  companies,	  however,	  the	  employment	   impact	   of	   their	   activity	   is	   limited.	   	   This	   paper	   will	   show	   evidence	   that	   listed	   mining	  companies	   use	   the	   JSE	   to	   finance	   their	   speculation	   in	   assets	   instead	   of	   productive	   and	   job-­‐creating	  investment.	  Detrimental	  effects	  on	  monetary	  policy	  and	  domestic	  credit	  growth	  can	  be	  expected	  since	  external	   finance	   is	   not	   flowing	   towards	   productive	   investment	   but	   ends	   up	   as	   cash	   holdings	   on	  corporate	   balance	   sheets.	   This	   trend	   in	   turn	   encourages	   rapid	   credit	   expansion,	   which	   recently	  favoured	  unsustainable	  consumption-­‐driven	  growth	   in	  South	  Africa,2	  leaving	   the	  country	  with	  heavy	  job	  losses	  and	  high	  household	  debt	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  global	  financial	  crisis.	  	  	  	  	  The	  article	  is	  organised	  as	  follows:	  part	  II	  shows	  that	  precaution	  is	  a	  valid	  motivation	  to	  hold	  cash,	  but	  mining	   firms	   also	  need	   liquid	   assets	   due	   to	   the	   speculative	  nature	   of	   their	   investment.	   These	   South	  African	   findings	   will	   be	   contrasted	   with	   international	   empirical	   evidence	   as	   well	   as	   theoretical	  explanations	   offered	   by	   economic	   theory	   in	   part	   III.	   Finally,	   in	   part	   IV	   the	   socio-­‐economic	  consequences	  of	  these	  cash	  holdings	  will	  be	  outlined	  in	  brief	  and	  from	  a	  macroeconomic	  perspective,	  before	  part	  V	  concludes.	  	   I. Introduction	  Until	   recently,	   the	   deepening	   of	   financial	   markets	   in	   developing	   countries	   has	   been	   almost	  unequivocally	  seen	  as	  growth-­‐enhancing.	  3	  A	  well-­‐developed	  capital	  market	  –	  so	  the	  argument	  –	  could	  provide	  a	  source	  of	  finance	  for	  productive	  investment,	  fostering	  growth.	  South	  Africa	  possesses	  one	  of	  the	  oldest	  stock	  exchanges	  among	  emerging	  economies,	  the	  Johannesburg	  Stock	  Exchange	  (JSE).	  Hence,	  it	  provides	  a	  good	  case	  study	  to	  scrutinise	  this	  growth-­‐enhancing	  effect.	  It	  will	  be	  argued	  that	  in	  fact	  a	  substantial	   number	   of	   JSE-­‐listed	   companies	   appear	   to	   hold	   on	   to	   large	   amounts	   of	   cash	   and	   cash	  equivalents	  instead	  of	  investing	  them.	  They	  do	  this	  out	  of	  precautionary	  but	  also	  speculative	  motives,	  whose	  developmental	  impact	  is	  most	  doubtful.	  Historically,	   finance	  and	  mining	  have	  dominated	  economic	  activity	   in	  South	  Africa.	  This	  article	  deals	  with	   the	   contemporary	   interaction	   between	   the	   two	   sectors.	   The	   South	   African	   equity	   market	   is	   a	  source	  of	  substantial	  funds	  for	  mining	  companies,	  however,	  the	  employment	  impact	  of	  their	  activity	  is	  limited.	   	   This	   paper	   will	   show	   evidence	   that	   listed	   mining	   companies	   use	   the	   JSE	   to	   finance	   their	  speculation	   in	   assets	   instead	   of	   productive	   and	   job-­‐creating	   investment.	   Detrimental	   effects	   on	  monetary	   policy	   and	   domestic	   credit	   growth	   can	   be	   expected	   since	   external	   finance	   is	   not	   flowing	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towards	  productive	  investment	  but	  ends	  up	  as	  cash	  holdings	  on	  corporate	  balance	  sheets.	  This	  trend	  in	  turn	  encourages	  rapid	  credit	  expansion,	  which	  recently	  favoured	  unsustainable	  consumption-­‐driven	  growth	   in	   South	   Africa,4	  leaving	   the	   country	   with	   heavy	   job	   losses	   and	   high	   household	   debt	   in	   the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  global	  financial	  crisis.	  	  	  	  	  These	   macroeconomic	   observations	   are	   important	   because	   the	   finance-­‐mining	   nexus	   impacts	   the	  welfare	  of	  ordinary	  South	  Africans,	  slowing	  down	  sustainable	  job	  creation.	  The	  country’s	  past	  growth	  trajectory	  –	  based	  around	  limited,	  and	  for	  the	  most	  part	  low	  skill,	   job	  creation	  –	  is	  likely	  to	  continue,	  supported	   by	   policy	   makers	   who	   identify	   sophisticated	   financial	   services	   and	   natural	   resource	  endowments	   as	   South	   Africa’s	   comparative	   advantages.5 	  Therefore,	   the	   insight	   that	   interactions	  between	   the	   finance	   and	   mining	   industries	   might	   result	   in	   economically	   and	   socially	   problematic	  outcomes	   is	   crucial	   for	   future	  policy	   formulation.	   In	   this	   sense	  other	   resource-­‐rich	  Southern	  African	  economies	   should	   learn	   from	   South	   Africa’s	   experience,	   being	   wary	   of	   rushing	   the	   development	   of	  their	  financial	  markets.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	   article	   will	   use	   corporate	   cash	   holdings	   of	   non-­‐financial	   firms	   as	   analytical	   lens.	   Similar	   to	   US	  companies,	  South	  African	  firms	  are	  holding	  record	  amounts	  of	  cash	  on	  their	  balance	  sheets.6	  It	  will	  be	  shown	  in	  part	  II	  that	  while	  precaution	  is	  a	  valid	  motivation	  to	  hold	  cash,	  mining	  firms	  also	  need	  liquid	  assets	  due	  to	  the	  speculative	  nature	  of	  their	  investment.	  To	  illustrate	  this	  point	  industry	  level	  data	  will	  be	   analysed,	   supplemented	   by	   fifteen	   corporate	   case	   studies.	   These	   South	   African	   findings	   will	   be	  contrasted	   with	   international	   empirical	   evidence	   as	   well	   as	   theoretical	   explanations	   offered	   by	  economic	  theory	  in	  part	  III.	  Finally,	  in	  part	  IV	  the	  socio-­‐economic	  consequences	  of	  these	  cash	  holdings	  will	  be	  outlined	  in	  brief	  and	  from	  a	  macroeconomic	  perspective,	  before	  part	  V	  concludes.	  
	   II. How	  South	  African	  companies	  use	  the	  financial	  markets	  	  This	  section	  aims	  at	  revealing	  which	  South	  African	  companies	  hold	  substantial	   liquid	  assets,	   i.e.	  cash	  and	  cash	  equivalents,	  and	  for	  what	  purpose.	  The	  preoccupation	  of	  economists	  and	  policy	  makers	  with	  cash	  holdings	  by	  non-­‐financial	  firms	  derives	  from	  two	  considerations:	  (1)	  that	  there	  has	  been	  a	  secular	  trend	  for	  these	  assets	  to	  rise	  (at	  least	  in	  major	  advanced	  economies)	  over	  the	  past	  two	  decades	  or	  so;	  and	   (2)	   that	   these	   cash	  holdings	   should	   in	   fact	  be	  negligible	  due	   to	   the	  opportunity	   cost	   they	   carry.	  Holding	   on	   to	   cash	  while	   there	   are	   profitable	   investment	   opportunities	  means	   foregone	   profit.	   The	  balance	  sheet	  structure	  of	  every	  company7	  results	  in	  assets	  balancing	  liabilities.	  Hence,	  available	  cash	  could	   be	   used	   to	   pay	   off	   existing	   liabilities,	   reducing	   overall	   costs	   and	   consequently	   increasing	  company	   profits.	   In	   the	   context	   of	   an	   emerging	   economy	   like	   South	   Africa,	   the	   consequences	   of	  foregone	  profit	  and	  investment	  can	  be	  dramatic	  since	  they	  manifest	  in	  missing	  jobs.	  In	  economics,	  the	  question	  why	  industrial8	  firms	  hold	  liquid	  assets	  on	  their	  balance	  sheets	  despite	  the	  negligible	  return	  and	   the	   opportunity	   cost	   of	   outstanding	   liabilities	   is	   part	   of	   the	   so-­‐called	   capital	   structure	   puzzle	  (Myers,	  1984).	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   companies	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  produce	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   in	   goods	   and	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   Importantly,	   these	   companies	   are	   not	   classified	   –	   e.g.	   registered	   or	  listed	  on	  the	  JSE	  –	  as	  financial	  corporations.	  	  
In	   order	   to	   analyse	   the	   significance	   of	   cash	   holdings	   for	   South	   African	   (non-­‐financial)	   firms	   some	  measure	   of	   company	   asset	   liquidity	   is	   necessary.	   In	   accounting,	   the	   cash	   ratio	   is	   one	   of	   the	   most	  commonly	  used	  liquidity	  measures,	  expressing	  firms’	  ability	  to	  meet	  their	  short-­‐term	  debt	  out	  of	  own	  cash.	  It	  expresses	  cash	  and	  cash	  equivalents	  as	  share	  of	  current	  liabilities:9	  (1)	   Cash	  ratio	  =	  !"#!  !  !"#!  !"!"#$%&'()!"#$%  !"##$%&  !"#$"!"%"&'	  Cash	  equivalents	  refer	  to	  financial	  instruments	  with	  a	  maturity	  span	  of	  three	  month	  or	  less.	  The	  three	  months	  period	  is	  somewhat	  arbitrarily	  chosen	  because	  there	  is	  no	  compelling	  reason	  to	  suppose	  that	  an	  instrument	  maturing	  within	  fourth	  month	  must	  necessarily	  be	  less	  liquid.10	  In	  fact,	  company	  shares	  traded	   at	   the	   stock	   exchange	   –	   such	   as	   the	   JSE	   –	  might	   be	   highly	   liquid	  without	   having	   a	  maturity	  period.	  For	  want	  of	  a	  more	  appropriate	  conventional	  measure,	  the	  cash	  ratio	  will	  be	  utilised	  to	  assess	  the	  overcapitalisation	  of	  JSE-­‐listed	  (non-­‐financial)	  firms.	  The	  concept	  of	  overcapitalisation	  identifies	  firms	  that	  hold	  substantial	  liquid	  assets	  not	  for	  operating,	  investing	  or	  financing	  of	  their	  core	  business	  activities,	  meaning	  production	  or	  service	  provision	  in	  the	  case	   of	   non-­‐financial	   firms,	   but	   rather	   for	   cash	   management	   and	   financial	   investment.11	  Some	   non-­‐financial	   firms	   utilise	   the	   capital	   market	   to	   finance	   their	   speculation	   in	   financial	   and	   non-­‐financial	  assets.	  When	  an	  industrial	  enterprise	  becomes	  a	  financial	  investor	  it	  generates	  income	  and	  profit	  from	  financial	  transactions	  (instead	  of	  production),	  effectively	  becoming	  a	  rentier	  firm12.	  A	  symptom	  of	  this	  behaviour	  is	  firms’	  overcapitalisation.	  The	   distinction	   between	   cash	   positions,	   which	   are	   held	   for	   operational,	   investment	   or	   financing	  purposes	  and	  those	  accumulated	  to	  simply	  obtain	  speculative	  gains	  and/or	  so-­‐called	  rentier	  profits13,	  is	  not	  clear-­‐cut.	  Especially,	  since	  non-­‐financial	  companies	  are	  in	  need	  of	  liquid	  assets	  to	  address	  short-­‐falls	  in	  cash	  flow	  during	  re-­‐occurring	  business	  cycle	  downswings.	  Some	  accounting	  practice	  suggests	  a	  cash	   ratio	   of	   around	   20	   per	   cent	   for	   non-­‐financial	   firms	   as	   advisable.14	  This	   is,	   however,	   not	   a	  generalised	  convention	  and	  likely	  to	  vary	  depending	  on	  the	  national	  and	  legislative	  context.	  	  Therefore,	  the	  following	  analysis	  will	  use	  two	  alternative	  thresholds	  to	  identify	  (1)	  overcapitalisation	  and	  (2)	  strong	  overcapitalisation	  amongst	  JSE-­‐listed	  firms,	  utilising	  the	  cash	  ratio:	  
(1) Firms	   with	   a	   cash	   ratio	   of	   45	   per	   cent	   and	   up	   to	   94	   per	   cent	   will	   be	   considered	   as	  overcapitalised	  and	   therefore	  most	   likely	   to	  be	  engaged	   in	   speculative	  or	   rentier	  operations.	  This	  threshold	  is	  taken	  from	  the	  sector	  analysis	  of	  the	  South	  African	  economy,	  accounting	  for	  domestic	   specificities.	   By	  way	   of	   comparison,	   financial	   companies	   listed	   on	   the	   JSE	  with	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  Cash	  is	  currency	  on	  hand	  and	  demand	  deposits	  with	  banks	  and	  other	  institutions.	  Cash	  equivalents	  are	  short-­‐term,	   highly-­‐liquid	   investments	   that	   are	   readily	   convertible	   to	   known	   amounts	   of	   cash,	  meaning	   that	   there	   is	  insignificant	  risk	  of	  change	  in	  value	  due	  to	  a	  change	  in	  the	  interest	  rate.	  Short-­‐term	  refers	  to	  three	  months	  or	  less.	  European	  Commission	  (2003)	   ‘International	  Accounting	  Standards	   IAS	  1	  (Revised	  1997)’,	   in:	  Official	  Journal	  of	  
the	  European	  Union,	  L	  261,	  5	  and	  Deloitte	  (2011)	  IFRS	  in	  your	  pocket,	  The	  Creative	  Studio	  at	  Deloitte,	  London.	  10	  Liquidity	   of	   financial	   instruments	   depends	   on	   the	   depth	   and	   demand	   for	   them	   in	   secondary	   markets,	  determining	  the	  ease	  with	  which	  the	  instrument	  can	  be	  sold	  on	  –	  and	  turned	  into	  money	  –	  before	  the	  end	  of	  its	  maturity.	  11	  Toporowski,	  J.	  (2008)	  ‘Excess	  Capital	  and	  Liquidity	  Management’,	  in:	  Levy	  Economics	  Institute	  Working	  Papers,	  549,	  New	  York,	  Levy	  Economics	  Institute:	  p.	  4.	  12	  Toporowski,	   J.	   (1993)	   The	   Economics	   of	   Financial	  Markets	   and	   The	   1987	   Crash,	  England,	   Aldershot,	   USA,	   E.	  Elgar.	  13	  These	  are	  profits	  generated	  through	  financial	  investment	  rather	  than	  production.	  See	  Keynes,	  J.	  M.	  (1936)	  The	  
General	  Theory	  Of	  Employment	  Interest	  and	  Money,	  London,	  Macmillan.	  14	  Wöltje,	  J.	  (2012)	  Finanzkennzahlen	  und	  Unternehmensbewertung,	  Freiburg,	  Haufe-­‐Lexware	  GmbH.	  
highest	  cash	  holdings	  in	  relation	  to	  current	  liabilities	  have	  cash	  ratios	  of	  around	  50	  per	  cent	  in	  aggregate	   and	   on	   average	   for	   the	   period	   1994	   to	   2012.	   A	   cash	   ratio	   of	   51.3	   per	   cent	   is	   the	  average	   for	   the	   three	   financial	   sub-­‐sectors	   with	   relatively	   high	   cash	   holdings,	   namely	  insurance,	   real	   estate	   and	   investment	   instruments	   (see	   table	   1).	   The	   financial	   companies	   in	  question	   deal	   for	   example	   with	   equity,	   currencies	   and	   real	   estate.	   Importantly,	   above	   this	  threshold	  the	  distinction	  between	  financial	  and	  non-­‐financial	   firms	  with	  respect	  to	  their	  cash	  management	   is	  blurred.	  Economic	  theory	  and	  policy,	  however,	   imply	  fundamentally	  different	  functions	   and	   forms	   for	   these	   two	   firm	   types.	   Therefore,	   the	   degree	   of	   liquidity	   held	   by	  financial	  firms	  can	  be	  used	  to	  determine	  the	  overcapitalisation	  of	  non-­‐financial	  companies:	  in	  the	   following	   45per	   cent	   (instead	   of	   50	   per	   cent)	   is	   the	   utilised	   ratio,	   allowing	   for	   a	   5	  percentage	  points	  error	  margin.	  Statistical	  analysis	  typically	  uses	  error	  margins	  to	  ensure	  that	  relevant	   phenomena	   are	   not	   excluded.	   Since	   the	   applied	   thresholds	   are	   arguably	   a	  conservative	  measure	  of	  excess	  cash	  statistical	  leniency	  is	  appropriate.	  	  	  
(2) Companies	  with	   a	   cash	   ratio	  of	  100	  per	   cent	   and	  more	   could	  pay	  off	   their	   entire	   short-­‐term	  debt	   while	   still	   retaining	   cash	   and	   cash	   equivalents	   on	   their	   balance	   sheets.	   Given	   forgone	  productive	   investment	   opportunities	   it	   does	   not	   seem	   reasonable	   to	   hold	   more	   than	   the	  equivalent	   of	   total	   current	   liabilities	   out	   of	   a	   precautionary	  motive.	   Anything	   beyond	   a	   cash	  ratio	   of	   100%	   seems	   differently	   motivated,	   e.g.	   by	   rentier	   profit	   or	   speculation.	   Thus,	   this	  constitutes	   the	   second	   threshold	   for	   overcapitalisation	   which	   will	   be	   called	   strong	  overcapitalisation	   due	   to	   its	   increased	   intensity.	   Once	   again,	   it	   will	   be	   allowed	   for	   an	   error	  margin	  meaning	  that	  the	  applied	  threshold	  for	  strongly	  overcapitalised	  firms	  is	  95	  per	  cent.	  Reviewing	  liquidity	  ratios	  for	  South	  African	  firms	  the	  McGregorBFA	  database	  is	  used,	  supplemented	  by	  companies’	  annual	  reports	  and	  financial	  statements.	  The	  database	  provides	  data	  for	  826	  non-­‐financial	  firms	  listed	  at	  the	  JSE	  between	  1970	  and	  2013.	  As	  of	  April	  2013,	  there	  were	  370	  listed	  firms	  on	  the	  JSE	  with	   a	   market	   capitalisation	   of	   7.8	   trillion	   R15,	   while	   South	   African	   gross	   domestic	   product	   (GDP)	  amounted	   to	   around	  3	   trillion	  R	   in	  201216.	   Table	  1	   shows	   cash	   ratios	  by	   sector	   and	  decade.	  For	   the	  analysis	  of	  the	  contemporary	  finance-­‐mining	  nexus	  in	  South	  Africa,	  the	  focus	  will	  be	  on	  the	  years	  since	  1994,	  the	  so-­‐called	  New	  South	  Africa.	  Data	  for	  795	  non-­‐financial	  firms	  are	  available	  from	  the	  database.	  	  The	   periodisation	   used	   in	   the	   table	   is	   based	   on	   socio-­‐economic	   events.	   The	   post-­‐Apartheid	   years	  during	   the	   1990s	   (1994-­‐1999)	   are	   treated	   as	   one	   period,	   coinciding	  with	   the	   presidency	   of	   Nelson	  Mandela	  and	  his	  attempt	  to	  reconcile	  the	  country.	  The	  early	  2000s	  (2000-­‐2007)	  were	  characterised	  by	  an	   economic	   upswing	   around	   the	   world	   and	   high	   and	   sustained	   GDP	   growth	   in	   South	   Africa.17	  Subsequently,	  the	  repercussions	  of	  the	  global	  financial	  crisis	  combined	  with	  slowing	  domestic	  growth	  plunged	  South	  Africa	  into	  recession	  by	  the	  final	  quarter	  of	  2008.	  	  
Table	  1	  (here)	  
	  Therefore,	  2008	  is	  treated	  separately.	  The	  country	  has	  experienced	  a	  recovery	  and	  moderate	  growth	  since,	  covering	  the	  latest	  period	  (2009-­‐2013).	  On	  average	  and	   in	  aggregate	  over	   the	  period	  1994	   to	  2013,	   the	   technology	  sector	  and	  diamond	  and	  gemstone	   mining,	   which	   is	   a	   sub-­‐sector	   of	   the	   mining	   industry,	   show	   cash	   ratios	   above	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  ShareData	  (2013)	  ShareData	  Online,	  South	  Africa.	  [Available	  under:	  http://www.sharedata.co.za].	   	  16	  National	  Treasury	  (2013)	  National	  Budget,	  South	  Africa.	  [Available	  under:	  http://www.treasury.gov.za].	  17	  4.4%	  annually	  on	  average.	  SARB	  (2013)	  Statistics,	  South	  African	  Reserve	  Bank,	  South	  Africa.	  [Available	  under:	  http://www.resbank.co.za].	  
overcapitalisation	  threshold	  (45	  per	  cent).	  Looking	  into	  the	  individual	  periods,	  only	  the	  utilities	  and	  oil	  and	   gas	   industries	   also	   exhibit	   cash	   ratios	   above	   the	   45	   per	   cent	   threshold.18	  Extremely	   high	   cash	  ratios	   in	  2008	  –	  as	  can	  be	  seen	   for	   industrial	  metals	  and	   industrials	  (see	  table	  1)	  –	  are	  an	  exception	  caused	   by	   the	   repercussions	   of	   the	   global	   crisis	   originating	   in	   the	   financial	   markets	   of	   the	   US	   and	  certain	  European	  countries.	  	  Generally,	   there	   is	   a	   concentration	   of	   overcapitalised	   firms,	   meaning	   firms	   with	   substantial	   cash	  holdings,	  within	  the	  basic	  materials	  industries.	  The	  basic	  materials	  sector	  covers	  companies	  engaged	  in	  the	  area	  of	  forestry	  and	  paper,	  industrial	  metals,	  chemicals	  and	  all	  types	  of	  mining	  (see	  table	  1).	  This	  picture	  becomes	  even	  clearer	  when	  considering	  cash	  ratios	  of	  individual	  firms,	  grouped	  according	  to	  sectors	   (see	   table	   2).	   Around	   half	   of	   all	   firms	   classified	   as	   basic	   material	   producers,	   oil	   &	   gas	  companies,	  technology	  and	  utilities	  providers	  are	  overcapitalised.	  However,	  the	  oil	  and	  gas	  as	  well	  as	  utilities	  sectors	  contain	  a	  very	  small	  number	  of	  companies	  (7	  in	  total).	  Hence,	  the	  bulk	  of	  companies	  hoarding	  cash	  can	  be	  found	  among	  basic	  material	  and	  technology	  corporations.	  
	  
Table	  2	  (here)	  
	  Furthermore,	   among	   the	   top	   20	   strongly	   overcapitalised	   firms	   during	   the	   period	   1994	   to	   2013	  fourteen	  were	   listed	  as	  basic	  materials	  producers	   (see	   table	  3).	  More	  precisely,	   these	   fourteen	   firms	  were	  all	  engaged	  in	  mining.	  The	  one	  company	  listed	  under	  industrials,	  Mine	  Restoration	  Investments,	  is	  in	  fact	  closely	  related	  to	  mining	  activity,	  dealing	  with	  mining	  assets	  at	  the	  end	  of	  their	  life	  span.	  This	  demonstrates	  the	  intensity	  and	  wide	  spread	  of	  overcapitalisation,	  meaning	  the	  substantial	  holding	  of	  highly	   liquid	   assets,	   among	   listed	  mining	   corporations	   in	   South	  Africa.	   The	   remaining	   five	   firms,	   all	  listed	   as	   consumer	   goods	   or	   consumer	   services	   companies,	   were	   either	   effectively	   financial	   and	  property	   investment	   companies	   –	   namely	   United	   Service	   Technologies	   and	   World	   Education	  Technologies19	  –	  or	  detailed	  data	  were	  not	  available	  for	  them	  because	  their	  delisting	  took	  place	  during	  the	  1990s	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Progress	  Industries	  and	  Oceana	  Investment	  Corporation.	  Finally,	  Wooltru	  Limited	  was	   in	   the	   state	  of	   selling	  off	   assets	   and	   liquidation	  between	  2001	  and	  2009,	   explaining	   its	  high	  cash	  ratio.	  	  
Table	  3	  (here)	  
	  The	   paper	   will	   therefore	   focus	   on	   the	   fourteen	   mining	   companies	   together	   with	   Mine	   Restoration	  Investments.	   It	   will	   be	   shown	   that	   the	   equity	   market	   is	   of	   great	   importance	   to	   generate	   these	  substantial	  cash	  holdings,	  illustrating	  that	  the	  link	  between	  finance	  and	  mining	  in	  South	  Africa	  seems	  as	  strong	  as	  ever.	  	  	  To	   understand	   the	   motivations	   of	   listed	   mining	   corporations	   to	   hold	   such	   large	   cash	   volumes	   in	  comparison	  to	  current	  liabilities	  these	  fifteen	  strongly	  overcapitalised	  non-­‐financial	  companies	  will	  be	  analysed	   in	   detail,	   using	   their	   annual	   reports	   and	   other	   supplementary	   sources	   available	   from	  McGregorBFA	  and	  ShareData.	  	  These	   strongly	   overcapitalised	  mining	   companies	   are	  mostly	   exploration	   companies,	   some	  of	  which	  were	   long-­‐established	   and	   delisted	   during	   the	   1990s	   –	   namely	   Barnato	   Exploration,	   Free	   State	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  Oil	  and	  gas	  in	  1994-­‐1999	  and	  utilities	  in	  2000-­‐2007.	  
19	  United	  Service	  Technologies	  were	  merely	  holding	  financial	  investment	  in	  UT	  Worldwide	  Inc.	  which	  is	  a	  supply	  chain	   solutions	   provider	   and	   itself	   not	   overcapitalised.	   World	   Education	   Technologies	   acquired	   a	   property	  investment	  portfolio	  in	  2000.	  
Development	   and	   Investment	   Corporation	   (Fredev)	   and	   Avgold	   –	   but	   most	   of	   them	   are	   emerging	  mining	  firms	  –	  namely	  Chrometco,	  Wits	  Gold,	  Kiwara,	  Sephaku,	  Kibo	  Mining,	  African	  Eagle	  Resources	  and	  Tawana.	  Their	  focus	  is	  resource	  exploration	  rather	  than	  income	  generation	  from	  actual	  mining.	  A	  smaller	  share	  of	  mining	  corporations	  in	  the	  sample	  is	  made	  up	  of	  well-­‐established	  mining	  enterprises,	  acquiring	   assets	   in	   order	   to	   prolong	   the	   commercial	   lifetime	   of	   their	   depleting	   mining	   resources.	  Among	   this	   second	   group	   are	   Village	   Main	   Reef	   Limited	   (Village),	   which	   undertook	   the	   reverse	  takeover20	  of	   another	   long-­‐standing	   South	   African	   mining	   house	   –	   Simmer	   &	   Jack	   Mines	   Limited	  (Simmer	  &	  Jack)	  –	  in	  2010	  and	  finally	  acquired	  all	  its	  mining	  assets	  in	  2012.	  Coal	  of	  Africa	  Resources	  (Coal	   of	   Africa)	   –	   an	   established	  Australian	  mining	   company	   –	   entered	   the	   South	  African	  market	   to	  obtain	  new	  mining	  assets	  and	  better	  access	  to	  the	   local	   financial	  markets,	   listing	  on	  the	   JSE	   in	  2006.	  Finally,	  Randex,	  another	  mature	  mining	  company,	  chose	  to	  sell	  off	   its	  mining	  rights,	  converting	  them	  into	  shareholdings	  in	  other	  mining	  firms.	  During	  this	  process,	  it	  was	  acquired	  by	  a	  financial	  company,	  Genbel	   Securities,	  which	   had	   the	   intention	   to	   finalise	   the	   sale	   of	   Randex’s	   remaining	  mining	   assets.	  Consequently	  Randex	  was	  delisted	  from	  the	  JSE	  in	  May	  1997.	  Table	   4	   presents	   company	   profiles	   of	   the	   fifteen	   strongly	   overcapitalised	   companies,	   offering	  information	  on	   their	  activities,	   equity	  market	   listings,	   income	  sources	  and	   JSE	  market	   capitalisation.	  The	  activity	  of	  emerging	  mining	  companies	  as	  well	  as	  mining	  exploration	   firms	   is	  highly	  speculative	  since	   these	  corporations	  do	  not	  have	  significant	   income	   from	  current	  operations.	  Wits	  Gold,	  Kiwara,	  Sephaku,	  Kibo,	  Tawana,	  and	  AER	  do	  not	  generate	  income	  from	  mining	  operations.	  The	  same	  is	  true	  for	  established	   exploration	   companies	   like	   Baranto	   and	   Fredev,	  which	   only	   generated	   irregular	   income	  from	   operations,	   being	   reliant	   on	   interest	   and	   dividends	   payments	   and	   financing	   from	   major	  shareholders	  for	  cash	  flow.	  Chrometco	  only	  transformed	  into	  an	  actual	  mining	  company	  in	  2010	  with	  no	  steady	  income	  flow	  prior	  to	  that	  date.	  	  
Table	  4	  (here)	  Since	   the	  exploration	  companies	  do	  not	  have	  any	  steady	  cash	   flow,	   their	  profits	  depend	  crucially	  on	  the	  rise	  of	  international	  mineral	  prices.	  In	  this	  sense,	  their	  activity	  is	  highly	  speculative,	  also	  exposed	  to	  exploration	  risk,	  of	  which	  the	  companies	  in	  question	  are	  aware:	  ‘Mineral	   exploration	   is	   highly	   speculative	   due	   to	   a	   number	   of	   significant	   risks,	   including	   the	   possible	  failure	  to	  discover	  mineral	  deposits	  that	  are	  sufficient	  in	  quantity	  and	  quality	  to	  justify	  the	  completion	  of	  pre-­‐feasibility	  or	  feasibility	  studies’.21	  	  	  Chrometco’s	   gamble	  over	   their	  Rooderand	  Chrome	  subsidiary	   is	   a	   good	   illustration	  of	   the	  price	  and	  exploration	   risk	   inherent	   in	   mining	   exploration.	   Rooderand	   Chrome	   was	   acquired	   in	   2006	   for	   a	  R600,000	  cash	  payment	  and	  a	  share	   issue	  worth	  R2	  million,	   to	  be	  bought	  back	  by	  Chrometco	  a	  year	  later.22	  In	  2007,	  it	  was	  sold	  to	  the	  Austrian	  company	  Deco	  Metal	  for	  R62	  million,	  resulting	  in	  a	  profit	  of	  more	  than	  R50	  million	  R	  after	  some	  minor	  investment	  expenditure	  on	  the	  mining	  site.	  Since	  the	  sale	  of	  Rooderand	  Chrome	  was	  conditional	  on	  the	  renewal	  of	  mining	  rights	  and	  Chrometco	  shareholders’	  approval,	  a	  management	  agreement	  was	  put	   into	  place	  according	  to	  which	  Deco	  Metal	  could	  initially	  exploit	  the	  mine	  for	  an	  annual	  payment	  of	  R13	  million.	  The	  management	  contract	  was	  valid	  for	  five	  years	  (until	  2011)	  at	  which	  point	  the	  mine	  would	  go	  over	  into	  Deco	  Metal’s	  possession,	  if	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  The	  term	  reverse	  takeover	  refers	  to	  the	  purchase	  of	  a	  large	  listed	  company	  by	  a	  small	  listed	  company	  and	  not	  –	  as	  in	  the	  US	  context	  –	  to	  the	  acquisition	  of	  a	  public	  corporation	  by	  a	  private	  firm.	  21	  Witwatersrand	  Consolidated	  Gold	  Resources	  (2007)	  Annual	  Report,	  South	  Africa:	  p.	  21.	  22	  Chrometco	  Limited	  (2007)	  Annual	  Report,	  South	  Africa.	  
all	  sales	  conditions	  were	  met.23	  Chrometco	  shareholders	  decided	  against	  a	  sale	  of	  the	  asset,	  which	  was	  valued	  at	  between	  R181	  million	  and	  R257	  million	  in	  2011.24	  Hence,	   shareholders	   assumed	   the	   exploitation	   of	   the	   asset	   by	   Chrometco	  would	   yield	   larger	   profits	  than	  the	  intended	  sale,	  while	  the	  management	  contract	  had	  provided	  for	  sufficient	  income	  to	  partially	  cover	  losses	  from	  Chrometco’s	  (non-­‐mining)	  operations.	  However,	  after	  re-­‐acquisition	  of	  the	  asset	  the	  project	   suffered	   a	   severe	   setback	   in	   2012	   because	   international	   chrome	   prices	   declined	   strongly,	  making	  large-­‐scale	  mining	  of	  chrome	  at	  Rooderand	  not	  economical.25	  Nevertheless,	  mining	  has	  started	  in	  2012	  and	  future	  development	  of	  the	  chrome	  price	  will	  decide	  about	  its	  profitability.	  	  Hence,	  financed	  by	  capital	  markets—namely	  through	  equity	  issuance—Chrometco	  was	  able	  to	  acquire	  a	  mining	  asset	  in	  the	  attempt	  to	  make	  a	  speculative	  profit,	  selling	  it	  on	  after	  a	  value	  gain.	  The	  fact	  that	  Chrometco	   finally	   decided	   against	   this	   option	   and	   for	   investment	   into	   actual	   mining	   operations,	  exemplifies	   the	   close	   connection	   between	   speculative	   and	   productive	   activity.	   In	   general,	   these	  emergent	  mining	   companies	   appear	   to	   be	   holding	   cash	   and	   cash	   equivalents	  well	   in	   excess	   of	   their	  current	   liabilities	   with	   hardly	   or	   no	   non-­‐current	   liabilities	   on	   their	   books	   in	   order	   to	   finance	  speculative	  subsidiary	  acquisition	  quickly	  and	   to	  avoid	   illiquidity	  given	   the	   lack	  of	   regular	  cash	   flow	  from	  operations.	  They	  effectively	  sidestep	  financial	  intermediaries	  while	  the	  capital	  market	  is	  used	  to	  acquire	  funds	  for	  speculation.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  other	  significant	  group	  of	  strongly	  overcapitalised	  mining	  companies	  in	  this	  sample	  of	  fifteen	  are	  long-­‐standing	  mining	  houses	  such	  as	  Coal	  of	  Africa,	  Village	  and	  Simmer	  &	  Jack.	  	  Village	   is	   one	   of	   the	   older	   South	   African	   gold	   mining	   companies—incorporated	   in	   1934—which,	  however,	  had	  to	  cease	  gold	  extraction	  in	  1995	  due	  to	  its	  non-­‐profitability,	  subsequently	  concentrating	  on	  the	  winding	  down	  of	  operations.	  Its	  substantial	  liquid	  assets—cash	  and	  cash	  equivalents	  as	  well	  as	  funds	  invested	  into	  a	  mine	  rehabilitation	  fund—allowed	  the	  company	  to	  survive	  for	  another	  15	  years	  without	   generating	  profit	   from	   their	  mining	   operations.	  More	   importantly,	   it	   helped	  Village	   to	   raise	  sufficient	   equity	   for	   a	   reverse	   takeover	   of	   Simmer	  &	   Jack	   Gold	  Mines	   in	   2011.	   By	   2012	   Village	   had	  acquired	  all	  of	  Simmer	  &	  Jack’s	  mining	  assets.	  This	  transaction	  left	  only	  a	  cash	  shell	  of	  Simmer	  &	  Jack	  that	   started	  mining	   around	   Johannesburg	   as	   far	   back	   as	   1887,	   listing	   at	   the	   JSE	   in	   1924.	   Given	   the	  declining	  volume	  and	  quality	  of	  mining	  assets,	  and	  unable	  to	  consistently	  generate	  profits,	  Simmer	  &	  Jack	   Mines	   have	   abandoned	   their	   mining	   activities	   and	   were	   delisted	   from	   the	   JSE	   in	   April	   2013.	  Nevertheless,	  equity	   finance	  has	  arguably	  prolonged	   the	   life	  span	  of	  Simmer	  &	   Jack,	  generating	  cash	  inflows	  when	  regular	  operations	  were	  making	  losses.	  	  Similarly,	  Coal	  of	  Africa	  –	  an	  Australian	  mining	  business	  incorporated	  during	  the	  late	  1970s	  –	  has	  used	  capital	  markets	  to	  acquire	  new	  mining	  assets,	  in	  response	  to	  declining	  profitability	  of	  their	  Australian	  operations.	  Coal	  of	  Africa	  is	  a	  long-­‐standing	  Australian	  mining	  company,	  listed	  in	  Australia	  as	  well	  as	  the	  UK	  and	  only	  recently	  (in	  2006)	  also	  listed	  on	  the	  JSE.	  Traditionally,	  a	  manufacturer	  and	  distributor	  of	   nickel	   and	  magnesium	  alloys	   the	   company	   refocused	  on	   coal	   exploration	   and	   extraction	   in	   South	  Africa	   as	  major	  business	   in	  2008.26	  Most	   likely	  due	   to	   this	   reorientation,	   operating	   income	  has	  been	  negative	  since	  2007	  and	  had	   to	  be	   financed	  via	  equity	   issuance	  as	  well	  as	  short-­‐term	  and	   long-­‐term	  debt.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  Chrometco	  (2008)	  Annual	  Report.	  24	  Chrometco	  (2011)	  Annual	  Report.	  25	  Chrometco	  (2012)	  Annual	  Report.	  26	  Coal	  Of	  Africa	  (2009)	  Annual	  Report,	  Australia.	   	  
In	   contrast	   to	   emerging	   and	  mining	   exploration	   enterprises,	   the	  well-­‐established	  mining	   companies	  appear	   to	   be	   cases	  where	   financial	  markets	  were	   not	   used	   for	   outright	   speculation	   but	   for	   income	  generation	   in	   order	   to	   counteract	   waning	   profitability	   of	   resource	   extraction.	   This	   is	   particularly	  visible	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Village.	  The	  company	  was	  a	  pure	  rentier	  firm	  between	  1995	  and	  2010.	  During	  the	  period	   its	   income	   from	  productive	   operations	   ceased	  with	   cash	   flow	  entirely	   generated	  by	   financial	  assets	   and	   fixed	   asset	   sales.	   Mature	   companies	   –	   even	   if	   in	   their	   decline	   –	   will	   rarely	   go	   bankrupt	  quickly	   due	   to	   the	   size	   of	   their	   accumulated	   assets.	   Lacking	   a	   productive	   outlet,	   financial	   income	   is	  likely	   to	   increasingly	   dominate,	   demonstrating	   the	   close	   interconnectedness	   of	   productive	   and	  financial	  activity	   in	  non-­‐financial	   firms.	   In	  the	  case	  of	  Randex	  the	  company’s	  mining	  rights	  became	  a	  purely	  financial	  asset,	  once	  mining	  operations	  ceased	  to	  be	  profitable	  for	  the	  firm	  itself.	  	  The	  two	  remaining	  firms	  of	  these	  fifteen	  are	  a	  mining	  company,	  Sephaku	  Holdings,	  attempting	  to	  enter	  the	  production	  of	  an	  industrial	  good,	  namely	  cement,	  and	  an	  industrial	  firm	  with	  a	  close	  connection	  to	  the	  mining	  industry:	  Mining	  Restoration	  Investments	  (MRI).	  	  Sephaku	  attempts	  to	  enter	  the	  South	  African	  cement	  industry	  which	  is	  perceived	  to	  be	  a	  mature	  sector,	  dominated	  by	  few	  producers.	  Nevertheless,	  given	  growing	  infrastructure	  and	  residential	  construction	  in	  South	  Africa	  Sephaku	  argues	  that	  current	  domestic	  capacity	  will	  not	  suffice	  to	  meet	  future	  demand.	  Hence,	  even	  though	  the	  company	  is	  currently	  focusing	  on	  exploration	  its	  medium-­‐term	  aim	  is	  to	  move	  into	   mining	   and	   processing	   of	   lime	   stone	   into	   cement.	   In	   this	   sense,	   its	   investment	   and	   financing	  position	  is	  risky	  due	  to	  an	  initial	  lack	  of	  cash	  flow.	  But	  this	  situation	  is	  expected	  to	  change	  by	  2013/14	  when	  mining	   starts.	   The	   economic	   viability	   of	   these	   expectations	  were	   validated	   in	   2013	   through	   a	  large	   and	   joint	   long-­‐term	   loan	   extended	   to	   Sephaku	   by	   Nedbank	   and	   Standard	   Bank.27	  Therefore,	  Sephaku	  seems	  to	  engage	  in	  entrepreneurial	  risk	  that	  is	  temporary	  and	  not	  an	  inherent	  and	  persistent	  part	  of	  the	  business	  model	  which	  in	  contrast	  appears	  the	  case	  for	  pure	  exploration	  companies.	  MRI	   grew	   out	   of	   the	   reverse	   takeover	   of	   Western	   Utilities	   Corporation	   by	   Capricorn	   Investment	  Holdings	  in	  2012.	  The	  latter	  was	  set	  up	  in	  1996	  as	  financial	  services	  group	  with	  interests	  in	  banking,	  insurance	  and	  asset	  management.	  	  Another	  characteristic	  of	  the	  fifteen	  strongly	  overcapitalised	  firms,	  which	  is	  worthwhile	  emphasising	  is	   the	   significant	   number	   of	   foreign-­‐origin	   enterprises.	   Five	   out	   of	   the	   fifteen	   where	   incorporated	  abroad,	   subsequently	   listing	   in	   South	   Africa	   to	   take	   advantage	   of	   the	   country’s	   capital	   market,	  attracting	   investment	   into	   the	  mining	   industry.	  Kiwara	   and	  AER	  are	  UK-­‐based	   companies,	  Kibo	  was	  incorporated	  in	  Ireland,	  whereas	  Coal	  of	  Africa	  and	  Tawana	  Resources	  were	  established	  in	  Australia.	  While	   such	   cross-­‐border	   investment	   is	   of	   course	   to	   be	   expected	   in	   a	   globalised	  world	   it	   does	   raise	  questions	   about	   the	   developmental	   impact	   of	   financial	   markets	   on	   emerging	   economies.	   Is	   a	  developing	  country	  really	  best	  served	  if	  investors	  –	  of	  domestic	  and	  foreign	  origins	  –	  use	  its	  financial	  markets	  to	  invest	  in	  speculative	  business	  ventures	  with	  profits	  potentially	  channelled	  abroad?	  And	  if	  not,	  how	  much	  of	  a	  developmental	  impact	  can	  financial	  markets	  have	  in	  such	  a	  country?	  III. How	  companies	  internationally	  use	  financial	  markets	  South	  African	  firms	  are	  by	  no	  means	  alone	  in	  their	  quest	  to	  increasingly	  amass	  liquid	  assets.	  The	  rise	  in	   cash	   holdings	   among	   non-­‐financial	   firms	   over	   the	   past	   two	   decades	   or	   so	   is	   a	   well-­‐documented	  phenomenon	   in	   major	   advanced	   economies.	   Apple	   and	   Google	   are	   some	   recent	   examples,	   which	  illustrate	  this	  more	  widespread	  trend.	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  Sephaku	  (2013)	  Annual	  Report,	  Pretoria,	  South	  Africa.	  
For	  instance,	  examining	  more	  than	  20,000	  non-­‐financial	  companies	  in	  seven	  countries	  Iskandar-­‐Datta	  &	  Jia28	  find	  that	  for	  non-­‐financial	  firms	  in	  Australia	  and	  Canada	  median	  cash	  and	  marketable	  securities	  as	   share	   of	   total	   assets	   have	  more	   than	   doubled	   between	   1991	   and	   2008.	   The	   ratio	   has	   grown	   by	  between	  40	  per	  cent	  and	  90	  per	  cent	  in	  Germany,	  the	  UK	  and	  the	  US	  over	  the	  same	  periods.	  Bates	  et	  al.29	  analysing	  data	   for	   almost	   14,000	  US	   industrial	   firms	   find	   that	   between	  1980	   and	  2006	   average	  cash	   ratios	  have	  more	   than	  doubled	   from	  cash	  and	  cash	  equivalents	  accounting	   for	  10.5	  per	   cent	  of	  total	  assets	  in	  1980	  to	  23.2	  per	  cent	  in	  2006.	  From	  a	  theoretical	  perspective,	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  industrial	  firms	  sitting	  on	  large	  cash	  piles	  has	  not	  been	  explained	  convincingly.	  The	  corporate	  finance	  literature	  –	  the	  branch	  of	  mainstream	  economics	  that	   focuses	  on	   financial	   transactions	  –	  sees	   firms’	   liquidity	  preference	  motivated	  by	  precaution,	   the	  transaction	  motive,	  tax	  rebates	  or	  agency	  problems.	  The	  agency	  motive	  tries	  to	  explain	  large	  cash	  holdings	  through	  the	  misalignment	  of	  shareholders’	  and	  managers’	  incentives,	  which	  gives	  rise	  to	  wasteful	  behaviour	  (and	  cash	  hoarding)	  by	  management.	  It	  is	  difficult	   to	   believe	   that	   shareholder	   rights	   deteriorated	   over	   the	   past	   couple	   of	   decades	   allowing	  managers	   to	   increasingly	   amass	   cash	   against	   the	   will	   of	   shareholders.	   Furthermore,	   the	   inverse	  argument	  has	  also	  been	  put	  forward	  by	  more	  critical	  economists:	  shareholder	  power	  within	  the	  firm	  has	   in	   fact	   increased,	   necessitating	   higher	   cash	   reserves	   by	   firms	   to	   meet	   demands	   for	   dividend	  payouts.30	  While	   shareholder	   rights	   appear	   to	   have	   in	   fact	   strengthened	   there	   is	   mixed	   evidence	  whether	  this	  must	   lead	  to	  more	  frequent	  (or	  higher)	  payments	  of	  dividends	  and	  large	  cash	  holdings.	  Al-­‐Najjar31	  finds	   a	   negative	   correlation	  between	  dividend	  payouts	   and	   cash	  holdings,	  while	  Bigelli	  &	  Sanchez-­‐Vidal32	  find	   a	   positive	   one.	   Iskandar-­‐Datta	   &	   Jia33	  reveal	   varying	   correlations	   among	   their	  sample	   of	   seven	   countries.	   Finally,	   Bates	   et	   al.34	  do	   not	   find	   evidence	   that	   the	   agency	   conflict	   has	  affected	  cash	  holdings	  among	  US	  firms	  at	  all.	  Similarly,	   it	   is	   difficult	   to	   believe	   that	   tax	   regulation,	  which	   can	   vary	   strongly	   across	   countries,	   can	  explain	  the	  hoarding	  of	  cash	  by	  firms	  in	  a	  large	  number	  of	  OECD	  countries.	  The	  tax	  motive	  argues	  that	  tax	  rebates	  available	  for	  debt-­‐financed	  investment	  might	  shape	  the	  capital	  structure	  of	  companies.	  The	  tax	  motive	  has	  also	  been	  challenged	  theoretically	  with	  the	  argument	  that	  interest	  payments	  generated	  by	  debt	  instruments	  (e.g.	  bonds)	  are	  nevertheless	  taxed,	  weakening	  if	  not	  completely	  invalidating,	  the	  incentive	  for	  corporations	  to	  raise	  leverage.35	  Hence,	   neither	   the	   tax	  motive	  nor	   agency	  problems	   are	   convincing	   explanations	   for	   the	  widespread	  rise	   in	   cash	   holdings	   among	   non-­‐financial	   firms.	   The	   precautionary	   and	   transaction	   motives	   might	  provide	   some	   deeper	   insights.	   Both	   motives	   are	   borrowed	   from	   John	   Maynard	   Keynes’s	   theory	   of	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liquidity	  preference,	  which	  predicts	  that	  under	  uncertainty36	  individuals	  will	  hold	  on	  to	  cash	  and	  cash	  equivalents	   in	   order	   to	   pay	   for	   transactions	   (transaction	   motive),	   meet	   unexpected	   expenses	  (precautionary	   motive)	   and	   speculate	   (speculative	   motive). 37 	  With	   respect	   to	   non-­‐financial	  corporations,	  uncertainty	  –	  according	  to	  the	  corporate	  finance	  literature	  –	  will	  induce	  firms	  to	  hold	  on	  to	  cash	  and	  cash	  equivalents	  because	  they	  will	  need	  cash	  reserves	  to	  meet	  their	  transactions	  as	  well	  as	  unexpected	  expenses.	  It	  is	  noteworthy	  that	  the	  speculative	  motive	  is	  typically	  left	  aside	  when	  looking	  for	  theoretical	  explanations	  to	  justify	  empirical	  findings	  on	  corporate	  cash	  holdings.	  	  In	   practice,	   uncertainty	   for	   firms’	   operations	   can	   refer	   to	   cash	   flow	   volatility 38 ,	  macroeconomic/industry	  uncertainty39	  or	  the	  uncertainty	  inherent	  in	  more	  risky	  types	  of	  investment	  such	   as	   research	   and	   development	   activity 40 .	   Corporations	   operating	   under	   higher	   levels	   of	  uncertainty	   are	   likely	   to	   face	   an	   elevated	   cost	   of	   external	   financing	   (e.g.	   less	   favourable	   credit	  conditions).	  This	  type	  of	  financial	  constraint	  might	  also	  prompt	  companies	  to	  hold	  on	  to	  liquidity41.	  	  	  Nevertheless,	   the	   reason	  why	   uncertainty	   has	   apparently	   increased	   over	   the	   past	   decades	   is	   rarely	  addressed.	  If	  uncertainty	  is	  understood	  to	  be	  a	  phenomenon	  created	  by	  asymmetric	  information,	  as	  is	  often	  the	  case,	  economic	  activity	  should	  have	  become	  more	  certain	  over	  time.	  Information	  technology	  has	   experienced	   immense	   progress	   since	   the	   1980s.	   Therefore,	   information	   asymmetries	   should	   be	  counteracted	  by	  our	  rising	  ability	  to	  gather,	  analyse	  and	  transmit	  ever-­‐larger	  volumes	  of	  information	  at	  increasing	  speed.	  Furthermore,	  regulatory	  certainty	  for	  (large)	  companies	  should	  have	  increased	  –	  eliminating	   another	   potential	   source	   of	   information	   asymmetry,	   namely	   between	   firms	   and	   state	  authorities	  –	  given	  the	  efforts	  of	  governments	  and	  international	  organisation	  to	  standardise	  legislation	  and	  limit	  state	  intervention	  into	  markets.42	  Hence,	   if	   uncertainty	   has	   in	   fact	   increased,	   inducing	   corporations	   to	   take	  more	   precautions,	   where	  does	   this	  uncertainty	  come	   from?	  One	  major	  change	   in	   international	  economic	   institutions	  since	   the	  1980s	   has	   been	   the	   rise	   of	   financial	  markets.	   Financial	  markets	   have	   grown	   in	   size43	  but	   have	   also	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transformed	  in	  character44.	  The	  push	  towards	  liberalisation	  of	  financial	  markets,	  and	  the	  privatisation	  of	   public	   institutions	   during	   the	   1980s	   and	   1990s,	   encouraged	   the	   emergence	   and	   growth	   of	  institutional	   investors	   such	   as	   pension	   funds.	   These	   are	   large	   financial	   players	   investing	   in	  government	  and	  corporate	  paper,	  able	  to	  channel	  sizeable	  volumes	  of	  financial	  funds	  into	  the	  markets.	  	  This	   institutional	   change	   has	   been	   important	   for	   listed	   non-­‐financial	   companies	   because	   increasing	  availability	   of	   financial	   funds	   makes	   equity	   issuance	   a	   lucrative	   source	   of	   relatively	   cheap	   finance.	  Proponents	  of	  financial	  market	  deepening	  as	  source	  of	  growth	  believe	  that	  these	  financial	  funds	  will	  be	  used	   for	   productive	   investment	   by	   the	   listed	   firms.	   Sceptics	   raise	   the	   point	   that	   in	   fact	   –	   and	  particularly	  in	  well-­‐developed	  financial	  markets	  –	  non-­‐financial	  corporations	  might	  use	  these	  funds	  in	  a	  speculative	  way.45	  	  For	   South	   Africa,	   speculative	   activity	   by	   certain	   mining	   corporations	   financed	   through	   financial	  markets	  has	  been	  identified	  in	  the	  previous	  section.	  As	  argued	  above,	  the	  activity	  of	  emerging	  mining	  companies	  as	  well	   as	  mining	  exploration	   firms	   is	  highly	   speculative	   since	   these	   corporations	  do	  not	  have	   significant	   income	   from	   current	   operations.	   Of	   course,	   the	   success	   of	   any	   business	   activity	   is	  initially	   uncertain	   which	   might	   seem	   speculative.	   Nevertheless,	   particularly	   exploration	   companies	  and	  maybe	  to	  a	  lesser	  extent	  emerging	  mining	  firms	  can	  be	  classified	  as	  speculative	  following	  Hyman	  Minsky’s	   definitions	   of	   financing	   arrangements	   for	   business	   enterprises.	   Following	   Minsky,	   a	  speculative	  arrangement	  is	  one,	  which	  cannot	  cover	  its	  own	  financing	  costs	  beyond	  interest	  servicing.	  In	  order	  to	  pay	  off	  the	  principle	  sum	  initially	  taken	  out	  as	  credit	  an	  appreciation	  in	  enterprise	  assets	  is	  necessary.	   In	   the	   case	  of	  mining	   firms,	   this	   appreciation	   can	  be	   the	   result	   of	  mineral	  deposits	  being	  discovered	  or	  rising	  international	  resource	  prices.	  Highly	  speculative	  business	  ventures,	  according	  to	  Minsky,	   are	   those	   which	   can	   neither	   carry	   their	   principle	   nor	   interest	   servicing	   costs	   without	   an	  appreciation	   of	   business	   assets.	   Such	   financing	   arrangements	   are	   called	   Ponzi	   finance	   in	   Minskyan	  terminology.46	  The	  case	  studies	  show	  that	  AER,	  Kibo,	  Kiwara	  and	  Tawana	  do	  not	  receive	  any	  income	  from	  operations.	  The	   only	   reason	   why	   they	   do	   not	   fall	   under	   Minsky’s	   Ponzi	   finance	   category	   is	   the	   fact	   that	   they	  finance	  themselves	  to	  a	  large	  extent	  through	  equity	  issuance	  and	  not	  debt.	  While	  the	  latter	  has	  to	  be	  repaid	  to	  the	  creditor,	  the	  former	  does	  not.	  Equity	  holders	  can	  only	  redeem	  their	  investment	  by	  selling	  on	  stocks	  in	  the	  secondary	  markets	  but	  not	  through	  repayment	  by	  the	  listed	  company.47	  Nevertheless,	  equity	   issuance	  has	  consequences	  for	  the	  emitting	  corporation	  because	   it	  generates	   liabilities,	  which	  need	   to	   be	   validated	   through	   the	   creation	   of	   equivalent	   assets.	   It	   has	   been	   shown	   that	   in	   the	   US	  increased	  uncertainty	  for	  companies	  –	  so-­‐called	  firm	  volatility	  –	  is	  closely	  related	  to	  rising	  exposure	  to	  financial	  markets,	   including	   the	   issuance	  of	  debt	  but	  also	  equity.	  For	  a	  sample	  of	  US	   industrial	   firms	  covering	   the	   years	   1955	   to	   2000	   and	   varying	   between	   800	   and	   almost	   11,000	   in	   the	   number	   of	  companies,	  Comin	  &	  Philippon48	  show	   that	   firm	  volatility	  has	   in	   fact	   risen	  more	   in	   industries	  where	  issuance	   of	   debt	   and	   equity	   has	   surged.	   Hence,	   the	   precautionary	   motive	   might	   be	   one	   reason	   for	  firms’	   higher	   liquidity	   preference,	   that	   is	   their	   desire	   to	   keep	   cash	   within	   easy	   reach.	   The	   liability	  structure	  of	  their	  balance	  sheets	  shapes	  the	  choice	  of	  their	  assets	  –	  including	  the	  degree	  of	  liquidity.	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A	  firm	  that	  is	  uncertain	  about	  when	  it	  will	  be	  able	  to	  generate	  its	  first	  income	  flows	  –	  such	  as	  a	  start-­‐up	  mining	  company	  –	   faces	   large	  unexpected	  (and	   in	   fact	  expected)	  expenses.	  As	  consequence,	   it	  keeps	  large	   sums	   of	   cash.	   These	   cash	   sums	   can	   then	   also	   be	   put	   to	  work,	   generating	   income	   –	   in	   form	   of	  interest	   –	   themselves.	   Chrometco,	   for	   instance,	   started	   receiving	   interest	   on	   their	   cash	   reserves	   in	  2008	   when	   they	   were	   shifted	   from	   a	   zero	   to	   a	   variable	   interest	   rate	   arrangement.	   This	   is	   nothing	  unusual.	   However,	   if	   the	   volume	   of	   the	   cash	   reserve	   is	   steadily	   rising	   and	   exceeds	   what	   would	   be	  needed	   to	  meet	   short-­‐term	  debt	   there	  might	   be	  more	   than	   the	  precautionary	  motive	   behind	   it.	   The	  firm	   might	   be	   turning	   into	   a	   rentier,	   e.g.	   a	   financial	   investor,	   using	   financial	   markets	   as	   source	   of	  income	  and	  profit.	  In	  extreme	  cases,	   industrial	  companies	  cease	  all	  their	  operations	  and	  only	  receive	  financial	   income	   (e.g.	   out	   of	   interest	   payments).	   This	   happened	   after	   Village	   closed	   down	   its	   gold	  extraction	   in	  1995.	  Apart	   from	  disposal	   of	   fixed	   assets	   their	  main	   income	   source	  during	   this	  period	  were	   financial	  assts.	  Hence,	  Village	   turned	   in	   fact	   into	  a	  pure	   rentier	   firm.	  This	   strategy	  allowed	   the	  mining	  company	  to	  survive	  for	  15	  years	  without	  any	  mining	  activity	  at	  all.	  Gold	  production	  was	  only	  resumed	  in	  2010	  after	  the	  acquisition	  of	  Simmer	  &	  Jack	  Mines’	  mining	  assets.	  	  	  
	   IV. Why	  we	  should	  be	  concerned	  about	  how	  firms	  use	  financial	  markets	  But	  why	   should	   the	   balance	   sheet	   structure	   of	   listed	   companies	   –	  meaning	  what	   type	   of	   assets	   and	  liabilities	  firms	  hold	  –	  bother	  us?	  There	  are	  three	  good	  reasons	  why	  it	  should:	  
(1) If	   industrial	   firms	  hold	  a	   larger	  share	  of	   their	  assets	   in	  cash,	   the	  share	  of	   their	   fixed	  assets	   is	  smaller.	   This	  means	   they	   invest	   relatively	   less.	   In	   advanced	   economies	   but	   also	   in	   emerging	  markets	  (including	  South	  Africa)	  private	  investment	  has	  been	  low	  and	  declining	  over	  the	  past	  decades.	  This	  is	  particularly	  problematic	  in	  South	  Africa	  where	  unemployment	  levels	  are	  some	  of	  the	  highest	  in	  the	  world.	  Lacking	  investment	  results	  in	  missing	  jobs.	  
(2) Economists	   and	   policy	  makers	   alike	   assume	   that	   cheap	   external	   finance	   encourages	   private	  investment,	   stimulating	   growth.	   This	   is	   the	   rationale	   behind	   conventional	   monetary	   policy.	  Lower	  interest	  rates	  are	  understood	  to	  provide	  cheaper	  funds	  for	  private	  investors.	  However,	  if	  firms	  are	  holding	  increasingly	  large	  volumes	  of	  liquid	  assets	  the	  link	  between	  cheap	  finance	  and	   investment	   is	  weakened	  and	  monetary	  policy	  with	   it.	  Firms	  might	  use	  credit	  and	  capital	  markets	  to	  support	  their	  cash	  hoards	  instead	  of	  financing	  investment.	  	  	  
(3) Finally,	  cash	  volumes	  are	  held	  within	  the	  financial	  system	  of	  a	  country,	  generating	  liabilities	  on	  the	  balance	  sheet	  of	  banks	  and	  other	  financial	  institutions.	  Since	  every	  liability	  necessitates	  an	  equivalent	  asset	  banks	  might	  be	  encouraged	  to	  extend	  more	  credit.	  Strong	  credit	  extension,	  in	  turn,	  can	  become	  unsustainable	   if	   it	   is	  not	  accompanied	  by	  rising	   investment	  but	  rather	  by	  a	  consumption	  boom,	  which	  was	  the	  case	  in	  South	  Africa	  during	  the	  2000s.	  Investment	   is	   a	   major	   driver	   of	   growth49.	   The	   Commission	   on	   Growth	   and	   Development,	   which	  analysed	   cases	   of	   successful	   and	   sustained	   growth	   periods	   in	   developing	   countries,	   identified	  investment	  levels	  of	  at	  least	  25	  per	  cent	  of	  GDP	  as	  necessary.50	  South	  Africa’s	  investment	  performance	  has	  been	  significantly	  below	  this	  threshold	  during	  the	  1990s	  and	  2000s,	  only	  edging	  up	  towards	  the	  late	  2000s	  as	  result	  of	  infrastructure	  investment	  undertaken	  by	  the	  government	  for	  the	  Football	  World	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49	  This	  is	  the	  case	  in	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  Keynes	  and	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Cup	  2010.	  Also	  noteworthy	  is	  that	  South	  Africa’s	  investment	  share	  in	  GDP	  has	  been	  notably	  below	  the	  average	  for	  emerging	  economies51	  (see	  graph	  1).	  
Graph	  1	  (here)	  
	  Hence,	  given	  the	  25	  per	  cent	  unemployment	  rate	  more	  investment	  and	  job	  creation	  is	  urgently	  needed	  in	  South	  Africa.	  Mining	  companies,	  which	  use	  the	  financial	  markets	  actively	  as	  has	  been	  shown	  above,	  are	  unlikely	  to	  address	  this	  need	  for	  jobs	  due	  to	  the	  sector’s	  high	  capital	  intensity.	  In	  fact,	  less	  than	  3	  per	  cent	  of	  all	  employed	  South	  Africans	  work	  in	  mining.52	  	  	  	  
Graph	  2	  (here)	  South	   Africa’s	   relatively	   poor	   investment	   levels	   (especially	   compared	   to	   the	   group	   of	   emerging	  economies	  on	  average)	   cannot	  be	  explained	  by	  excessively	  high	   interest	   rates	   (see	  graph	  2).	  On	   the	  contrary,	  real	  interest	  rates	  in	  South	  Africa	  have	  been	  below	  the	  average	  of	  its	  emerging	  market	  peers	  by	  around	  1	  percentage	  point	  during	  the	  1990s	  and	  2000s.	  Therefore,	  South	  African	  monetary	  policy	  appears	   to	   have	   been	   unable	   to	   encourage	   stronger	   investment	   and	   job	   creation	   over	   the	   past	   two	  decades	  despite	  comparatively	  low	  real	  interest	  rates.	  	  However,	  credit	  expansion	  has	  been	  remarkably	  high	  –	  and	  far	  above	  emerging	  market	  average	  (see	  graph	  3)	  –	  in	  South	  Africa.	  During	  the	  2000s	  credit	  to	  the	  private	  sector	  has	  exceeded	  180	  per	  cent	  of	  GDP.	  This	   level	   is	  well	  above	  the	  threshold	  (of	  around	  80-­‐100	  per	  cent	  of	  GDP)	  at	  which	  economists	  start	   to	   caution	   against	   the	   potentially	   destabilising	   effect	   of	   credit	   on	   growth.53	  Given	   subdued	  investment	  levels,	  it	  is	  hardly	  surprising	  that	  the	  accelerated	  growth	  the	  country	  experienced	  between	  2003	   and	   2008	   proved	   to	   be	   mainly	   based	   on	   credit-­‐financed	   consumption,	   and	   therefore	  unsustainable.	  Consequently,	  South	  Africa	  lost	  almost	  1	  million	  jobs	  once	  the	  credit-­‐led	  boom	  came	  to	  an	  end	  in	  2008.54	  	  Credit	   extension	   was	   backed	   by	   corporate	   deposits	   held	   in	   South	   African	   bank	   accounts.	   Graph	   4	  shows	  that	  total	  deposits	  of	  the	  private	  sector	  carried	  on	  banks’	  balance	  sheets	  more	  than	  quadrupled	  from	  R600	  billion	  in	  2000	  to	  R2.5	  trillion	  by	  2011.	  During	  this	  expansion	  the	  share	  of	  firms’	  claims	  on	  the	   banking	   sector	   increasingly	   gained	   in	   weight,	   while	   household	   deposits	   constituted	   a	   declining	  share	   of	   overall	   deposits.	   In	   2000,	   households	   and	   firms	   both	   provided	   roughly	   one	   third	   of	   all	  deposits.	  	  
Graph	  3	  (here)	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51	  The	  group	  of	  emerging	  economies	  are	  defined	  based	  on	  average	  income	  per	  capita	  and	  include	  the	  following	  countries:	   Algeria,	   Antigua	   and	   Barbuda,	   Argentina,	   Azerbaijan,	   Belarus,	   Bosnia	   and	   Herzegovina,	   Botswana,	  Brazil,	   Bulgaria,	   Chile,	   China,	   Colombia,	   Costa	   Rica,	   Dominica,	   Dominican	   Republic,	   Ecuador,	   FYR	   Macedonia,	  Gabon,	   Grenada,	   Islamic	   Republic	   of	   Iran,	   Jamaica,	   Jordan,	   Kazakhstan,	   Latvia,	   Lebanon,	   Libya,	   Lithuania,	  Malaysia,	  Maldives,	  Mauritius,	  Mexico,	  Montenegro,	  Namibia,	  Panama,	  Peru,	  Romania,	  Russia,	  Serbia,	  Seychelles,	  South	   Africa,	   St.	   Lucia,	   St.	   Vincent	   and	   the	   Grenadines,	   Suriname,	   Thailand,	   Tunisia,	   Turkey,	   Turkmenistan,	  Uruguay,	  Venezuela.	  52	  StatsSA	  (2013)	  Quarterly	  Labour	  Force	  Survey,	  Statistics	  South	  Africa,	  Pretoria.	   	  53	  Cecchetti,	   S.	   G.	   and	   Kharroubi,	   E.	   (2012)	   ‘Reassessing	   the	   Impact	   of	   Finance	   and	   Growth’,	   in:	   BIS	  Working	  
Papers	  No.	  381,	  Monetary	  and	  Economic	  Department,	  Bank	  for	  International	  Settlement.	  	  54	  870,000	   jobs	   were	   lost	   in	   South	   Africa	   in	   2009.	   National	   Treasury	   (2010)	   ‘Chapter	   3	   –	   Employment’,	   in:	  National	  Budget	  2010,	  Pretoria.	  
	  
By	  2011,	  corporate	  claims	  on	  the	  banking	  sector	  exceeded	  50	  per	  cent	  of	  all	  deposits	  while	  households	  only	  accounted	   for	  23	  per	  cent	  of	   total	  deposits.	  Total	  deposits	  make	  up	  90	  per	  cent	  of	  overall	  bank	  liabilities.	  Thus,	  increasing	  corporate	  cash	  holdings	  on	  bank	  deposits	  might	  have	  facilitated	  the	  South	  African	  credit	  boom	  during	  the	  2000s.	  From	   a	   policy	   perspective,	   excessive	   cash	   holdings	   by	   industrial	   firms	   are	   worrisome	   due	   to	   a	  dampening	  effect	  on	  investment	  and	  employment,	  which	  is	  likely	  to	  accompany	  a	  rise	  in	  liquid	  assets	  on	  firms’	  balance	  sheets.	  Furthermore,	   if	  companies	  hoard	  cash	  monetary	  policy	  might	  be	  weakened	  since	   cheap	   credit	   is	   not	   always	   transformed	   into	   investment	   but	  might	   be	   used	   to	   generate	   liquid	  assets	  (i.e.	  cash	  holdings).	  Finally,	  there	  is	  a	  risk	  that	  cash	  held	  in	  bank	  deposits	  encourage	  domestic	  credit	  creation,	  which	  –	  combined	  with	  subdued	  investment	  activity	  –	  might	  generate	  a	  credit-­‐fuelled	  consumption	  boom.	  	  	  
Graph	  4	  (here)	  	   V. Conclusion	  Similarly	  to	  companies	  operating	  in	  major	  OECD	  economies,	  South	  African	  listed	  (non-­‐financial)	  firms	  hold	  significant	  cash	  volumes.	  While	  precaution	  might	  be	  one	  reason	  for	  these	  cash	  piles	  speculation	  with	  mining	  assets	  appears	  to	  be	  another	  one.	  Case	  studies	  of	  the	  fifteen	  firms	  with	  some	  of	  the	  largest	  cash	   holdings	   relative	   to	   their	   short-­‐term	   debt	   show	   that	   this	   type	   of	   speculation	   is	   often	   financed	  through	   equity	   markets.	   This	   calls	   into	   question	   the	   developmental	   impact	   of	   financial	   market	  deepening.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  when	  capital	  markets	  are	  used	  to	  support	  cash	  hoarding	  the	  impact	  on	  job	  creation,	  monetary	  policy	  effectiveness	  and	  financial	  stability	  is	  most	  likely	  detrimental.	  Therefore,	   resource-­‐rich	   emerging	   and	   developing	   economies	   should	   be	  wary	   not	   to	   emulate	   South	  African	   finance-­‐mining	   dynamics.	   Countries	   like	   Botswana	   or	  Mozambique	   should	   be	   careful	   not	   to	  rush	  their	  financial	  development	  and	  capital	  market	  growth	  without	  ensuring	  healthy	  levels	  of	  private	  investment	  and	  a	  strong	  labour	  market.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Appendix	  
Table	  1.	  Cash	  ratios	  by	  sector	  and	  decade,	  1994-­‐2013	  
Sub-­‐Sector	   1994-­‐1999	   2000-­‐2007	   2008	   2009-­‐2013	   Average	  
Basic	  materials	  
	   	   	   	   	  Forestry	  &	  Paper	   21.2%	   24.4%	   14.2%	   20.7%	   22.1%	  
Industrial	  Metals	   39.3%	   41.8%	   66.9%	   36.9%	   41.3%	  
Chemicals	   11.0%	   21.2%	   9.1%	   18.0%	   16.7%	  
Mining	  
	   	   	   	   	  Coal	   51.3%	   9.0%	   0.8%	   41.0%	   28.7%	  
Diamond	  &	  Gemstones	   38.0%	   99.1%	   15.3%	   16.3%	   58.0%	  
General	  Mining	   52.4%	   22.0%	   24.2%	   43.5%	   36.2%	  
Platinum	  &	  Precious	  Metals	   34.5%	   18.1%	   23.9%	   18.9%	   23.8%	  
Gold	   25.6%	   24.7%	   12.7%	   43.3%	   28.3%	  
Consumer	  Goods	   19.0%	   26.3%	   19.5%	   19.8%	   22.3%	  
Consumer	  Services	   27.1%	   31.1%	   25.9%	   23.0%	   27.9%	  
Finance	  
	   	   	   	   	  Banks	   4.4%	   7.2%	   3.0%	   3.2%	   7.4%	  
Financial	  Services	   18.6%	   14.4%	   9.2%	   8.8%	   27.7%	  
Insurance	   77.1%	   26.8%	   10.5%	   9.4%	   38.2%	  
Investment	  Instruments	   67.8%	   96.2%	   23.4%	   29.2%	   69.3%	  
Real	  Estate	   97.6%	   30.2%	   13.9%	   9.7%	   46.3%	  
Health	  Care	   3.9%	   28.5%	   19.7%	   29.0%	   20.4%	  
Industrials	   20.8%	   21.5%	   323.1%	   27.3%	   32.7%	  
Oil	  &	  Gas	   51.5%	   16.6%	   13.1%	   41.9%	   28.3%	  
Technology	   54.0%	   45.1%	   36.4%	   34.3%	   45.2%	  
Telecommunication	   28.5%	   17.5%	   35.6%	   32.2%	   25.0%	  
Utilities	   20.5%	   69.3%	   2.4%	   18.8%	   44.9%	  
Note:	  Cash	  ratios	  of	  45%-­‐94%	  are	  marked	  in	  yellow.	  
Cash	  ratios	  of	  95%	  and	  more	  are	  marked	  in	  red.	  
Source:	  McGregorBFA	  database	  and	  author’s	  own	  calculations,	  2013.	  	  	  
Table	  2.	  Cash	  ratios	  by	  firm	  and	  sector,	  average	  1994-­‐2013	  
Cash	  ratio	  of	  
Sector	   >45%	   >95%	   no	  of	  firms	  
Basic	  materials	   46%	   31%	   187	  
Consumer	  goods	   23%	   6%	   101	  
Consumer	  services	   26%	   11%	   170	  
Health	  care	   24%	   19%	   21	  
Industrials	   20%	   10%	   229	  
Oil	  &	  gas	   60%	   40%	   5	  
Technology	   45%	   22%	   73	  
Telecommunications	   40%	   20%	   10	  
Utilities	   50%	   0%	   2	  
Total	   30%	   16%	   795	  




Table	  3.	  Cash	  ratios	  for	  the	  top	  20	  strongly	  overcapitalised	  firms	  listed	  on	  the	  JSE,	  1994-­‐2013	  
Firm	   Sector	   Status	   1994-­‐2013	   1994-­‐1999	   2000-­‐2007	   2008	   2009-­‐2013	  





Delisted	  2001-­‐Nov	   5242%	   5%	   7861%	   	   	  





Delisted	  2004-­‐Dec	   2587%	   15%	   5674%	   	   	  
Village	  Main	  Reef	  
Limited	  
Basic	  materials	   Trading	   2541%	   0%	   4783%	   9675%	   86%	  
Randex	  Ltd	   Basic	  materials	   Delisted	  1997-­‐May	   2467%	   2467%	   	   	   	  
Progress	  Industries	   Consumer	  goods	   Delisted	  1999-­‐Sep	   2465%	   2465%	   	   	   	  
Wooltru	  Limited	   Consumer	  
services	  
Delisted	  2010-­‐Nov	   2346%	   10%	   3411%	   10100%	   89%	  
Witwatersrand	  Cons	  
Gold	  Resources	  
Basic	  materials	   Trading	   1786%	   	   2690%	   1437%	   1299%	  
Free	  State	  
Development	  &	  Invest	  
Corp	  Ltd	  
Basic	  materials	   Delisted	  2003-­‐Nov	   1729%	   1719%	   1744%	   	   	  
Avgold	  Ltd	   Basic	  materials	   Delisted	  2004-­‐May	   1443%	   2392%	   20%	   	   	  
Kiwara	  Plc	   Basic	  materials	   Delisted	  2010-­‐Feb	   982%	   	   	   1341%	   622%	  
Sephaku	  Holdings	  
Limited	  
Basic	  materials	   Trading	   915%	   	   	   	   915%	  
Kibo	  Mining	  Plc	   Basic	  materials	   Trading	   868%	   	   	   	   868%	  
African	  Eagle	  Resources	  
Plc	  
Basic	  materials	   Trading	   855%	   	   	   1007%	   805%	  
Coal	  Of	  Africa	  Limited	   Basic	  materials	   Trading	   850%	   	   553%	   3667%	   219%	  
Mine	  Restoration	  
Investments	  Ltd	  
Industrials	   Trading	   790%	   	   	   	   790%	  
Simmer	  And	  Jack	  Mines	  
Limited	  
Basic	  materials	   Suspended	  2012-­‐
Dec	  





Delisted	  in	  late	  
1990s	  
764%	   764%	   	   	   	  
Tawana	  Resources	  Nl	   Basic	  materials	   Trading	   755%	   	   424%	   4%	   1337%	  
	  
Source:	  McGregorBFA	  database	  and	  author’s	  own	  calculations,	  2013.	  	  	  
	  
	  
Table	  4.	  Company	  profiles	  of	  15	  very	  strongly	  overcapitalised	  JSE-­‐listed	  companies	  
Name	   Company	  profile	  
Chrometco	  Limited	  
(Chrometco)	  
Activity Copper, cobalt, manganese and iron ore exploration and 
mining. 
Incorporation/ listing Incorporated in South Africa in October 2002, listed on 
the JSE AltX in August 2005. 	  	  
	  	   Income sources The company has been concentrating on mining 
exploration until 2011 when mining operations at 
Rooderand Chrome began. Main income sources have 
been financial income (since 2008 when interest rates 
on liquid assets were changed from 0% to a variable 
rate) and sales/management of mines. 
	  	    
	  	    
	  	    
	  	    
	  	   JSE market capitalisation 
(April 2013) 
41 million Rand (rank 348 out of 370 listed companies). 
Barnato	  Exploration	  Ltd	  
(Barnato)	  
Activity Mining exploration. 
Incorporation/ listing Incorporated in South Africa in 1988, listed on the JSE in 
1988. 
Income sources Irregular income from operations, funded through loans 
from JCI. 
	   Comments The company received administrative and technical 
support from JCI through a management contract. The 
contract went over to Western Area Limited as JCI 
restructured. Finally, the company was acquired by JCI 
to to enhance its mineral rights portfolio through the 
introduction of a BEE partner. 
	  	   Market capitalisation 
(April 2013) 
Delisted in October 2003 after becoming a wholly-owned 
subsidiary of JCI. 
Village	  Main	  Reef	  
Limited	  (Village)	  
Activity Until 1995: recovery of gold from sand dumps; 
 1995-2010: closure activities; 
	  	    Since 2010: after the reverse takeover of Simmer & Jack 
Mines Limited activities are mining of gold, platinum and 
other minerals. 	  	    
	  	   Incorporation/ listing Incorporated in South Africa in 1934, listed on the JSE in 
1944. 
	  	   Income sources Until 1995: gold mining; 1995-2010: income from asset 
sales and limited interest on liquid assets; since 2010: 
mining operations. 	  	    
	  	   JSE market capitalisation 
(April 2013) 
777 million Rand (rank 221 out of 370 listed companies). 
Randex	  Ltd	  (Randex)	   Activity Gold and other mineral mining and exploration. 
Incorporation/ listing Incorporated in South Africa. 
Income sources Mining operations, investment in other mining 
companies and lease of mining rights. 
	  	   Comments Mature mining company; Genbel and subsequently 
Genbel Securities was the majority shareholder and also 
acts as administrator. After Randex converted major 
mineral rights into shareholdings and anticipating the 
sale of Randex's remaining mineral rights the company 
was converted into a wholly-owned subsidiary of Genbel 
Securities - a financial investment company - and 
delisted. 
	  	   Market capitalisation 
(April 2013) 
Delisted in May 1997 after becoming a wholly-owned 
subsidiary of Genbel Securities. 
Witwatersrand	  
Consolidated	  Gold	  
Resources	  (Wits	  Gold)	  
Activity Gold and uranium exploration. 
Incorporation/ listing Incorporated in South Africa in December 2002, listed on 
the JSE in April 2006, secondary listing on the Toronto 
Stock Exchange in January 2008.  
	  	   Income sources Gold exploration but not mining itself, implying the main 
income sources are sales/management of mines.  
	  	    
	  	   JSE market capitalisation 
(April 2013) 

































Activity Mineral mining and exploration. 
Incorporation/ listing Incorporated in South Africa.  
Income sources No income from mining operations but from interest and 
dividends. 
Comments The company was acquired by Randgold & Exploration 
which was then integrated into JCI Limited to simplify the 
holding structure. 
	  	   Market capitalisation 
(April 2013) 
Delisted in November 2003 after acquisition of Free 
State Development & Investment Corporation by 
Randgold & Exploration. 
Avgold	  Ltd	  (Avgold)	   Activity Gold mining, development and exploration. 
Incorporation/ listing Incorporated in South Africa in November 1990 as 
Target Exploration Company LImited, listed on the JSE 
in December 1996, listed on the Brussels Stock 
Exchange. 
Income sources Income from operations, disposal of mining assets, 
financial investment and rights offers. 
Comments The company was incorporated to reorganise the mining 
assets of Anglovaal, the company's controlling 
shareholder. These assets are Hartebeestfontein and 
Loraine mines, Target, Sun Oribi and ETCons.  
	  	   Market capitalisation 
(April 2013) 
Delisted in May 2004 after the acquisition of Avgold by 
Harmony Gold Mining Company Limited. 
Kiwara	  Plc	   Activity Base metal exploration. 
(Kiwara)	   Incorporation/ listing Primary listing on the London Stock Exchange (AIM), 
	  	    secondary listing on the JSE in April 2008. 
	  	   Income sources No operating income, limited interest on liquid assets, 
financing through equity issuance. 	  	    
	  	   Comments In 2009 Kiwara had difficulties raising capital. The 
International Financial Corporation of the World Bank 
Group agreed to purchase shares for cash worth 6 
million US dollar (with an option on further 9 million US 
dollar). In 2010 First New Quantum bought Kiwara, 
delisting from the JSE in February.  
	  	    
	  	    
	  	    
	  	    
	  	   JSE market capitalisation 
(April 2013) 
Delisted in February 2010 after acquisition of Kiwara by 
First New Quantum. 
Sephaku	  Holdings	  
Limited	  (Sephaku)	  
Activity (Industrial) mineral exporation, development and 
investment. 
Incorporation/ listing Incorporated in South Africa as Zeranza in February 
2005, renamed to Sephaku Holdings Limited in May 
2005, listed on the JSE in August 2009.  
	  	    No operating income, financing initially through equity 
issuance and subsequently long-term debt. 
	  	   JSE market capitalisation 
(April 2013) 












Gold and nickel exploration. 
Incorporation/ listing Incorporated in Ireland in 2008. Primary listing at the 
London Stock Exchange (AIM) since 2010, secondary 
listing at the JSE in May 2011. 
	  	    
	  	    
	  	   Income sources No operating income, limited current liabilities, no non-
current liabilities, financed through equity issuance. 	  	    
	  	   Market capitalisation 
(April 2013) 
155 million Rand (ranked 296 out of 370 listed 
companies) 
African	  Eagle	  Resources	   Activity Mineral exploration. 
(AER)	   Incorporation/ listing Incorporated in the UK in 1996. Primary listing on the 
London Stock Exchange (AIM), secondary listing on the 
JSE (AltX) in August 2007. 	  	  
 
	  	   Income sources Acquisition and disposal of subsidiary companies/mines, 
no income from mining operations, financed through 
equity issuance. 	  	  
 
	  	   JSE market capitalisation 
(April 2013) 
187 million Rand (ranked 284 out of 370 listed 
companies). 
Coal	  of	  Africa	  Resources	   Activity Coal exploration and mining. 
(Coal	  of	  Africa)	   Incorporation/ listing Incorporated in 1979 in Australia. Primary listing on the 
Australian Stock Exchange in 1980, secondary listings 
on the London Stock Exchang (AIM) in 2005 and on the 
JSE in November 2006. 
	  	    
	  	    
	  	   Income sources Since 2007 Coal of Africa has been making losses on 
operations financed through equity issuance, current and 
non-current liabilities. It has also been very active in 
acquisition and disposal of subsidiary firms. 
	  	    
	  	    
	  	   JSE market capitalisation 
(April 2013) 




Activity Water treatment technology. 
Incorporation/ listing Established by a reverse take over of Western Utilities 
Corporation by Capricorn Investment Holdings in 2012. (MRI)	    
	  	   Income sources No operating income yet, income from dividends and 




Comments Capricorn Investment Holdings was listed as financial 
company on the JSE. At the point of reverse acquisition 
Capricorn was merely a cash shell, not possessing any 
business operations. The acquisition of Western Utilities 
Coporation was financed by equity issuance. 
	   JSE market capitalisation 
(April 2013) 
94 million Rand (ranked 317 out of 370 listed 
companies). 
Simmer	  &	  Jack	  Mines	  
Limited	  (Simmer	  &	  
Jack)	  
Activity Gold exploration and mining. 
Incorporation/ listing Established in South Africa in 1887, listed on the JSE in 
1924 and the LSE. 
	  	   Income sources No income from operations since early 1990s (except 
2002-03, 2007-08), strong growth in investment 
expenditure since 2006, financed through equity and 
(mostly long-term) borrowing. 
	  	   Comments Mining assets have been declining in volume and 
quality. Simmer & Jack have been exploring and 
acquiring mining assets. 
	  	   JSE market capitalisation 
(April 2013) 




Activity Mineral and diamond exploration. 
Incorporation/ listing Incorporated in Australian in November 1998, listed on 
the ASX in April 2001, secondary listing on the JSE in 
November 2005. 
	  	   Income sources No operating income, financing through equity issuance. 
	  	   Comments The balance sheet had to be reduced in 2009 and 
operations reoriented towards exploration and more 
involvement of joint venture partners due to lacking 
capitalisation. 
	  	   JSE market capitalisation 
(April 2013) 
R111 million (rank 308 out of 370 listed companies). 
Source:	  Companies’	  annual	  reports,	  various	  years.	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Data	  Source:	  World	  Bank.	  
	  
Graph	  4.	  Firms’	  and	  Households’	  deposits	  as	  share	  in	  total	  deposits	  held	  with	  South	  African	  
banks	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